BBS in a Box 2/BBS in a box - Trilogy II.iso/Files/MUG News/EFF/puzzle2.txt

Text File | 1992-08-03 | 32.5 KB | 660 lines | [TEXT/EDIT]

A little sunlight is the best disinfectant."
Justice Louis Brandeis

Over a year ago, in a condition of giddier innocence than I enjoy
today, I wrote the following about the discovery of Cyberspace:
Imagine discovering a continent so vast that it may have no other
side. Imagine a new world with more resources than all our future
greed might exhaust, more opportunities than there will ever be
entrepreneurs enough to exploit, and a peculiar kind of real estate
which expands with development.

One less felicitous feature of this terrain which I hadn't noticed at the
time was a long-encamped and immense army of occupation.

This army represents interests which are difficult to define. It guards
the area against unidentified enemies. It meticulously observes
almost every activity undertaken there, and continuously prevents
most who inhabit its domain from drawing any blinds against such
observation.

This army marshals at least 40,000 troops, owns the most advanced
computing resources in the world, and uses funds the dispersal of
which does not fall under any democratic review.

Imagining this force won't require the inventive powers of a William
Gibson. The American Occupation Army of Cyberspace exists. Its
name is the National Security Agency.

It can be argued that this peculiar institution inhibits free trade, has
damaged American competitiveness, and poses a threat to liberty
anywhere people communicate with electrons. Its principal function,
as my colleague John Gilmore puts it, is "wire-tapping the world." It
is free to do this without a warrant from any judge.

It is legally constrained from domestic surveillance, but precious few
people are in a good position to watch what, how, or whom the NSA
watches. Those who are tend to be temperamentally sympathetic to
its objectives and methods. They like power, and power understands
the importance of keeping it own secrets and learning everyone
else's.

Whether it is meticulously ignoring every American byte or not, the
NSA is certainly pursuing policies which will render our domestic
affairs transparent to anyone who can afford big digital hardware.
Such policies could have profound consequences on our liberty and
privacy.

More to point, the role of the NSA in the area of domestic privacy
needs to be assessed in the light of other recent federal initiatives
which seem aimed at permanently denying privacy to the
inhabitants of Cyberspace, whether foreign or American.

Finally it seems an opportune time, directly following our
disorienting victory in the Cold War, to ask if the threats from which
the NSA purportedly protects Americans from are as significant as
the hazards the NSA's activities present.

Like most Americans I'd never given much thought to the NSA until
recently. (Indeed its very existence was a secret for much of my life.
Beltway types used to joke that NSA stood for "No Such Agency.") I
vaguely knew that the NSA was one of the twelve or so shadowy
federal spook houses erected shortly after the creation of the Iron
Curtain with the purpose of stopping its advance.

The NSA originated in response to a memorandum sent by Harry
Truman on October 24, 1952 to Secretary of State Dean Acheson and
Defense Secretary Robert Lovatt. This memo, the very existence of
which remained secret for almost 40 years, created the NSA, placed
it under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and charged it
with monitoring and decoding any signal transmission relevant to the
security of the United States.

Even after I started noticing the NSA, my natural immunity to
paranoia combined with a belief in the incompetence of all
bureaucracies continued to mute any sense of alarm. This was before
I began to understand the subterranean battles raging over data
encryption and the NSA's role in them. Lately, I'm less sanguine.

Encryption may be the only reliable method for securing privacy in
the inherently public domain of Cyberspace. I certainly trust it more
than privacy protection laws. Relying on government to protect your
privacy is like asking a peeping tom to install your window blinds.

In fact, we already have a strong-sounding federal law protecting
our electronic privacy, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act or
ECPA. But this law is not very effective in those areas where
electronic eaves dropping is technically easy. This is especially true
in the area of cellular phone conversations, which, under the current
analog transmission standard, are easily accessible to anyone from
the FBI to you.

The degree of present-day law enforcement apprehension over
secure cellular encryption provides evidence of how seriously
they've been taking ECPA. Law enforcement organizations are
moving on a variety of fronts to see that robust electronic privacy
protection systems don't become generally available to the public.
Indeed, the current administration may be so determined to achieve
this end they may be willing to paralyze progress in America's most
promising technologies rather than yield.

Push is coming to shove in two areas of communications technology:
digital transmission of heretofore analog signals, and the encryption
of transmitted data.

As the communications service providers move to packet switching,
fiber optic transmission lines, digital wireless, ISDN and other
advanced techniques, what have been discrete channels of
continuous electrical impulses, voices audible to anyone with
alligator clips on the right wires, are now becoming chaotic blasts of
data packets, readily intelligible only to the sender and receiver. This
development effectively forecloses traditional wire-tapping
techniques, even as it provides new and different opportunities for
electronic surveillance.

It is in the latter area where the NSA knows its stuff. A fair
percentage of the digital signals dispatched on planet Earth must
pass at some point through the NSA's big sieve in Fort Meade,
Maryland, 12 underground acres of the heaviest hardware in the
computing world. There, unless these packets are also encrypted
with a particularly knotty algorithm, sorting them back into their
original continuity is not very difficult.

In 1991, alarmed at a future in which it would have to sort through
an endless fruit salad of encrypted bits, the FBI persuaded Senator
Joseph Biden to include certain language in Senate Bill 266. The new
language in the bill required electronic communications services and
those who created communications devices to implement only such
encryption methods as would assure government's  ability to extract
the plain text of any voice or data communications in which it took a
legal interest. It was as if the government had responded to a
technological leap in lock design by requiring all building contractors
to supply it with skeleton keys to every door in America.

The provision raised wide-spread concern in the computer
community, which was better equipped to understand its
implications than the general public. In August of last year, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, in cooperation with Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility and other industry groups,
successfully lobbied to have it removed from the bill.

Our celebration was restrained. We knew we hadn't seen the last of
it. For one thing, the movement to digital communications does create
some serious obstacles to traditional wire-tapping procedures. I fully
expected that law enforcement would be back with new proposals,
which I hoped might be ones we could support. But what I didn't
understand then, and am only now beginning to appreciate, was the
extent to which this issue had already been engaged by the NSA in
the obscure area of export controls over data encryption algorithms.
Encryption algorithms, despite their purely defensive characteristics,
have been regarded by the government of this country as weapons
of war for many years. If they are to be employed for privacy (as
opposed to authentication) and they are any good at all, their export
is licensed under State Department's International Traffic in Arms
Regulations or ITAR.

The encryption watchdog is the NSA. It has been enforcing a policy,
neither debated nor even admitted to, which holds that if a device or
program contains an encryption scheme which the NSA can’t break
fairly easily, it will not be licensed for international sale.
Aside for marveling at the silliness of trying to embargo algorithms,
a practice about as pragmatic as restricting the export of wind, I
didn't pay much attention to the implications of NSA encryption
policies until February of this year. It was then that I learned about
the deliberations of an obscure group of cellular industry
representatives called the Ad Hoc Authentication Task Force, TR45.3
and of the influence which the NSA has apparently exercised over
their findings.

In the stately fashion characteristic of standard-setting bodies, this
group has been working for several years on a standard for digital
cellular transmission, authentication, and privacy protection. This
standard is known by the characteristically whimsical telco moniker
IS-54B.

In February they met near Giants Stadium in East Rutherford, NJ. At
that meeting, they recommended, and agreed not to publish, an
encryption scheme for American-made digital cellular systems which
many sophisticated observers believe to be intentionally vulnerable.
It was further thought by many observers that this “dumbing down”
had been done indirect cooperation with the NSA.
Given the secret nature of the new algorithm, its actual merits were
difficult to assess. But many cryptologists believe there is enough in
the published portions of the standard to confirm that it isn’t any
good.

One cryptographic expert, who asked not to be identified lest the
NSA take reprisals against his company, said:
"The voice privacy scheme, as opposed to the authentication scheme,
is pitifully easy to break. It involves the generation of two `voice
privacy masks' each 260 bits long. They are generated as a
byproduct of the authentication algorithm and remain fixed for the
duration of a call. The voice privacy masks are exclusive_ORed with
each frame of data from the vocoder at the transmitter. The receiver
XORs the same mask with the incoming data frame to recover the
original plain text. Anyone familiar with the fundamentals of
cryptanalysis can easily see how weak this scheme is."

And indeed, Whitfield Diffie, co-inventor of Public Key cryptography
and arguably the dean of this obscure field, told me this about the
fixed masks:
"Given that description of the encryption process, there is no need for
the opponents to know how the masks were generated. Routine
cryptanalytic operations will quickly determine the masks and
remove them."

Some on the committee claimed that possible NSA refusal of export
licensing had no bearing on the algorithm they chose. But their
decision not to publish the entire method and expose it to
cryptanalytical abuse (not to mention ANSI certification) was
accompanied by the following convoluted justification:
"It is the belief of the majority of the Ad Hoc Group, based on our
current understanding of the export requirements, that a published
algorithm would facilitate the cracking of the algorithm to the extent
that its fundamental purpose is defeated or compromised." (Emphasis
added.)

Now this is a weird paragraph any way you parse it, but its most
singular quality is the sudden, incongruous appearance of export
requirements in a paragraph otherwise devoted to algorithmic
integrity. In fact, this paragraph is itself code, the plain text of which
goes something like this: "We're adopting this algorithm because, if
we don't, the NSA will slam an export embargo on all domestically
manufactured digital cellular phones."

Obviously, the cellular phone system manufacturers and providers
are not going to produce one model for overseas sale and another for
domestic production. Thus, a primary effect of NSA-driven efforts to
deny some unnamed foreign enemy secure cellular communications
is on domestic security. The wireless channels available to Americans
will be cloaked in a mathematical veil so thin that, as one crypto-
expert put it, "Any county sheriff with the right PC-based black box
will be able to monitor your cellular conversations."

When I heard him say that, it suddenly became clear to me that,
whether consciously undertaken with that goal or not, the most
important result of the NSA's encryption embargoes has been the
future convenience of domestic law enforcement. Thanks to NSA
export policies, they will be assured that, as more Americans protect
their privacy with encryption, it will be of a sort easily penetrated
by authority.

I find it increasingly hard to imagine this is not their real objective
as well. Surely, the NSA must be aware of how ineffectual their
efforts have been in keeping good encryption out of inimical military
possession. An algorithm is somewhat less easily stopped at the
border than, say, a nuclear reactor. As William Neukom, head of
Microsoft Legal puts it, "The notion that you can control this
technology is comical."

I became further persuaded that this was the case upon hearing,
from a couple of sources, that the Russians have been using the
possibly uncrackable (and American) RSA algorithm in their missile
launch codes for the last ten years and that, for as little as five bucks,
one can get a software package called Crypto II on the streets of
Saint Petersburg which includes both RSA and DES encryption
systems.

Nevertheless, the NSA has been willing to cost American business a
lot of revenue rather than allow domestic products with strong
encryption into the global market.

While it's impossible to set a credible figure on what that loss might
add up to, it's high. Jim Bidzos, whose RSA Data Security licenses RSA,
points to one major Swiss bid in which a hundred million dollar
contract for financial computer terminals went to a European vendor
after American companies were prohibited by the NSA from
exporting a truly secure network.

The list of export software containing intentionally broken
encryption is also long. Lotus Notes ships in two versions. Don’t count
on much protection from the encryption in the export version. Both
Microsoft and Novell have been thwarted in their efforts to include
RSA in their international networking software, despite frequent
publication of the entire RSA algorithm in technical journals all over
the world.

With hardware, the job has been easier. NSA levied against the
inclusion of a DES chip in the AS/390 series IBM mainframes in late
1990 despite the fact that, by this time, DES was in widespread use
around the world, including semi-official adoption by our official
enemy, the USSR.

I now realize that the Soviets have not been the NSA's main concern
at any time lately. Naively hoping that, with the collapse of the Evil
Empire, the NSA might be out of work, I learned that, given their
own vigorous crypto systems and their long use of some embargoed
products, the Russians could not have been the threat from whom
this forbidden knowledge was to be kept. Who has the enemy been
then? I started to ask around.

Cited again and again as the real object of the embargoes were Third-
World countries, terrorists and... criminals. Criminals, most generally
drug-flavored, kept coming up, and nobody seemed concerned that
some of their operations might be located in areas supposedly off-
limits to NSA scrutiny.

Presumably the NSA is restricted from conducting American
surveillance by both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978(FISA) and a series of presidential directives, beginning with
one issued by President Ford following Richard Nixon's bold misuse
of the NSA, in which he explicitly directed the NSA to conduct
widespread domestic surveillance of political dissidents and drug
users.

But whether or not FISA has actually limited the NSA's abilities to
conduct domestic surveillance seemed less relevant the more I
thought about it. A better question to ask was, "Who is best served
by the NSA's encryption export policies?" The answer is clear:
domestic law enforcement. Was this the result of some plot between
NSA and, say, the Department of Justice? Not necessarily.

Certainly in the case of the digital cellular standard, cultural
congruity between foreign intelligence, domestic law enforcement,
and what somebody referred to as "spook wannabes on the TR45.3
committee" might have a lot more to do with the its eventual flavor
than any actual whisperings along the Potomac.

Unable to get anyone presently employed by the NSA to comment on
this or any other matter, I approached a couple of old hands for a
highly distilled sample of intelligence culture.

I called Admirals Stansfield Turner and Bobby Ray Inman. Their
Carter administration positions as, respectively, CIA and NSA
Directors, had endowed them with considerable experience in such
matters In addition, both are generally regarded to be somewhat
more sensitive to the limits of democratic power than their
successors. And their successors seemed unlikely to return my calls.
My phone conversations with Turner and Inman were amiable
enough, but they didn't ease my gathering sense that the NSA takes
an active interest in areas beyond its authorized field of scrutiny.
Turner started out by saying he was in no position to confirm or
deny any suspicions about direct NSA-FBI cooperation on encryption.
Still, he didn't think I was being irrational in raising the question. In
fact, he genially encouraged me to investigate the matter further.
He also said that while a sub rosa arrangement between the NSA and
the Department of Justice to compromise domestic encryption would
be "injudicious," he could think of no law, including FISA (which he
helped design), which would prevent it.

Alarmingly, this gentleman who has written eloquently on the
hazards of surveillance in a democracy did not seem terribly
concerned that our digital shelters are being rendered permanently
translucent by and to the government. He said, "A threat could
develop...terrorism, narcotics, whatever...where the public would be
pleased that all electronic traffic was open to decryption. You can't
legislate something which forecloses the possibility of meeting that
kind of emergency."

Admiral Inman had even more enthusiasm for assertive
governmental supervision. Although he admitted no real knowledge
of the events behind the new cellular encryption standard, he wasn't
disturbed to hear it might be purposely flawed.

And, despite the fact that his responsibilities as NSA Director had
been restricted to foreign intelligence, he seemed a lot more
comfortable talking about threats on the home front.
"The Department of Justice," Inman began, "has a very legitimate
worry. The major weapon against white collar crime has been the
court-ordered wiretap. If the criminal elements go to using a high
quality cipher, the principal defense against narcotics traffic is gone."
This didn't sound like a guy who, were he still head of NSA, would
rebuff FBI attempts to get a little help from his agency.

He brushed off my concerns about the weakness of the cellular
encryption standard. "If all you're seeking is personal privacy, you
can get that with a very minimal amount of encipherment."
Well, I wondered, Privacy from whom?

Inman seemed to regard real, virile encryption to be something
rather like a Saturday Night Special. "My answer," he said, "would be
legislation which would make it a criminal offense to use encrypted
communication to conceal criminal activity."

Wouldn't that render all encrypted traffic automatically suspect? I
asked.

"Well," he said, "you could have a registry of institutions which can
legally use ciphers. If you get somebody using one who isn't
registered, then you go after him."

You can have my encryption algorithm, I thought to myself, when
you pry my cold dead fingers from its private key.

It wasn't a big sample, but it was enough to gain an appreciation of
the cultural climate of the intelligence community. And these guys
are the liberals. What legal efficiencies might their Republican
successors be willing to employ to protect the American Way?
Without the familiar presence of the Soviets, we can expect a sharp
increase in over-rated bogeymen and virtual states of emergency.
This is already well under way. I think we can expect our drifting
and confused hardliners to burn the Reichstag repeatedly until they
have managed to extract from our induced alarm the sort of
government which makes them feel safe.

This process has been under way for some time. One sees it in the
war on terrorism, against which pursuit "no liberty is absolute," as
Admiral Turner put it. This, despite the fact that, during last year for
which I have a solid figure, 1987, only 7 Americans succumbed to
terrorism.

You can also see it clearly under way in the War on Some Drugs. The
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution has largely disappeared in
this civil war. And among the people I spoke with, it seemed a
common canon that drugs (by which one does not mean Jim Beam,
Marlboros, Folger's, or Halcion) were a sufficient evil to merit the
government's holding any keys it wanted.

One individual close to the committee said that at least some of the
aforementioned "spook wannabes" on the committee were interested
in weak cellular encryption because they considered warrants not
"practical" when it came to pursuing drug dealers and other criminals
using cellular phones.

In a fearful America, where the people cry for shorter chains and
smaller cages, such privileges as secure personal communications are
increasingly regarded as expendable luxuries. As Whitfield Diffie put
it, "From the consistent way in which Americans seem to put security
ahead of freedom, I fear that most would prefer that all electronic
traffic was open to government decryption."

In any event, while I found no proof of an NSA-FBI conspiracy to gut
the American cellular phone encryption standard, it seemed clear to
me that none was needed. The same results can be delivered by a
cultural "auto-conspiracy" between like-minded hardliners and
cellular companies who will care about privacy only when their
customers do.

You don't have to be a hand-wringing libertarian like me to worry
about the domestic consequences of the NSA's encryption embargoes.
They are also, as stated previously, bad for business. Unless, of
course, the business of America is no longer business but, as
sometimes seems the case these days, crime control.

As Ron Rivest (the "R" in RSA) said to me, "We have the largest
information-based economy in the world. We have lots of reasons for
wanting to protect information, and weakening our encryption
systems for the convenience of law enforcement doesn't serve the
national interest."

But by early March, it was clear that this "business-oriented"
administration had made a clear choice to favor cops over commerce
even if the costs to the American economy were to become
extremely high.

A sense of White House seriousness in this regard could be taken
from their response to the first serious effort by Congress to bring
the NSA to task for its encryption embargoes. Rep. Mel Levine (D-
Calif.) proposed an amendment to the Export Administration Act to
transfer mass market software controls to the Commerce
Department, which would relax the rules. The administration
responded by saying that they would veto the entire bill if the
Levine amendment remained attached to it.

Even though it appeared the NSA had little to fear from Congress, the
Levine amendment may have been part of what placed the agency in
a bargaining mood for the first time. They entered into discussions
with the Software Publishers Association who, acting primarily on
behalf of Microsoft and Lotus, got to them to agree "in principle" to a
streamlined process for export licensing of encryption which might
provide for more robust standards than previously allowed.

But the negotiations between the NSA and the SPA were being
conducted behind closed doors. The NSA imposed an understanding
that any agreement would be set forth only in a "confidential" letter
to Congress. As in the case of the digital cellular standard, this would
eliminate the public scrutiny by cryptography researchers.

Furthermore, some cryptographers worried that the encryption key
lengths to which the SPA appeared willing to restrict its members
might be too short for the sorts of brute-force decryption assaults
which advances in processor technology will yield in the near future.
And brute force decryption has always been the NSA's strong suit.
The impression engendered by the style of the NSA-SPA negotiations
did not inspire confidence. The lack of confidence will operate to the
continued advantage of foreign manufacturers in an era when more
and more institutions are going to be concerned about the privacy of
their digital communications.

But the economic damage which the NSA-SPA agreement might cause
would be minor compared to what would result from a startling new
federal initiative, the Department of Justice's proposed legislation on
digital telephony. If you're wondering what happened to the
snooping provisions which were in Senate Bill 266, look no further.
They're back. Bigger and bolder than before.

They are contained in a sweeping proposal by the Justice Department
to the Senate Commerce Committee.  It proposes legislation which
would "require providers of electronic communications services and
private branch exchanges to ensure that the Government's ability to
lawfully intercept communications is unimpeded by the introduction
of advanced digital telecommunications technology or any other
telecommunications technology."

This really means what it says: before any advance in
telecommunications technology can be deployed, the service
providers and manufacturers must assure the cops that they can tap
into it. In other words, development in digital communications
technology must come to a screeching halt until The Department of
Justice can be assured that it will be able to grab and examine data
packets with the same facility they have long enjoyed with analog
wire-tapping.

It gets worse. The initiative also provides that, if requested by the
Attorney General, "any Commission proceeding concerning
regulations, standards or registrations issued or to be issued under
authority of this section shall be closed to the public." This essentially
places the Attorney General in a position to shut down any
telecommunications advance without benefit of public hearing.

When I first heard of the digital telephony proposal, I assumed it
was a kind of bargaining chip. I couldn't imagine it was serious. But it
now appears they are going to the mattresses on this one.

Taken together with NSA's continued assertion of its authority over
encryption, a pattern becomes clear. The government of the United
States is so determined to maintain law enforcement's traditional
wire-tapping abilities in the digital age that it is willing to cripple the
American economy. This may sound hyperbolic, but I believe it is
not.

The greatest technological advantages this country presently enjoys
are in the areas of software and telecommunications. Furthermore,
thanks in large part to the Internet, much of America is already
wired for bytes. This is as significant an economic edge in the
Information Age as the existence of a railroad system was for
England one hundred fifty years ago.

If we continue to permit the NSA to cripple our software and further
convey to the Department of Justice the right to stop development
the Net without public input, we are sacrificing both our economic
future and our liberties. And all in the name of combating terrorism
and drugs.

This has now gone far enough. I have always been inclined to view
the American government as fairly benign as such creatures go. I am
generally the least paranoid person I know, but there is something
scary about a government which cares more about putting its nose in
your business than it does about keeping that business healthy.
As I write this, a new ad hoc working group on digital privacy,
coordinated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is scrambling to
meet the challenge. The group includes representatives from
organizations like AT&T, the Regional Bells, IBM, Microsoft, the
Electronic Mail Association and about thirty other companies and
public interest groups.

Under the direction of Jerry Berman, EFF's Washington office
director, and John Podesta, a capable lobbyist and privacy specialist
who helped draft the ECPA, this group intends to stop the provisions
in digital telephony proposal from entering the statute books.

We intend to work with federal law enforcement officials to address
their legitimate concerns. We don’t dispute their need to conduct
some electronic surveillance, but we believe this can be assured by
more restrained methods than they're proposing. We are also
preparing a thorough examination of the NSA's encryption export
policies and looking into the constitutional implications of those
policies. Rather than negotiating behind closed doors, as the SPA has
been attempting to do, America's digital industries have a strong
self-interest in banding together to bring the NSA's procedures and
objectives into the sunlight of public discussion.

Finally, we are hoping to open a dialog with the NSA. We need to
develop a better understanding of their perception of the world and
its threats. Who are they guarding us against and how does
encryption fit into that endeavor? Despite our opposition to their
policies on encryption export, we assume that NSA operations have
some merit. But we would like to be able to rationally balance the
merits against the costs.

The legal right to express oneself is meaningless if there is no secure
medium through which that expression may travel. By the same
token, the right to hold unpopular opinions is forfeit unless one can
discuss those opinions with others of like mind without the
government listening in.

Even if you trust the current American government, as I am still
inclined to, there is a kind of corrupting power in the ability to create
public policy in secret while assuring that the public will have little
secrecy of its own.

In its secrecy and technological might, the NSA already occupies a
very powerful position. And conveying to the Department of Justice
what amounts to licensing authority for all communications
technology would give it a control of information distribution rarely
asserted over English-speaking people since Oliver Cromwell's Star
Chamber Proceedings.

Are there threats, foreign or domestic, which are sufficiently grave to
merit the conveyance of such vast legal and technological might?
And even if the NSA and FBI may be trusted with such power today,
will they always be trustworthy? Will we be able to do anything
about it if they aren't?

Senator Frank Church said of NSA technology in 1975 words which
are more urgent today:
"That capability at any time could be turned around on the American
people and no American would have any privacy left. There would
be no place to hide. If this government ever became a tyranny, the
technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the
government could enable it to impose total tyranny. There would be
no way to fight back, because the most careful effort to combine
together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it
was done, is within the reach of the government to know. Such is the
capacity of this technology."

San Francisco, California
Monday, May 4, 1992









The EFF encourages any organization which might have a stake  in
the future of cyberspace to become involved.
Letters expressing your concern may be addressed to:

Sen. Ernest Hollings
Chairman, Senate Commerce Committee
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC
and to
Don Edwards
Chairman, Subcommitee on Constitutional Rights
House Judiciary Committee.
Washington, DC

I would appreciate hearing those concerns myself. Feel free to copy
me with those letters at my physical address,

John Perry Barlow
P.O. Box 1009
Pinedale, WY 82941
or in Cyberspace -- [e-mail].

If your organization is interested in becoming part of the digital
privacy working group, please contact the EFF's Washington office at:

666 Pennsylvania Avenue SE,
Suite 303,
Washington, DC 20003
202/544-9237

EFF also encourages individuals interested in these issues to join the
organization. Contact us at:

Electronic Frontier Foundation
155 Second Street
Cambridge, MA 02141
617/864-0665
[e-mail].